发布时间： Sun Feb 11 17:34:43 CST 2018 供稿人：卡罗琳・肯尼\Caroline Kenny QC
本文将着重探讨香港与新加坡关于仲裁中第三方资助的最新立法动向。通过这些立法，中国香港与新加坡两个重要的仲裁地也与澳大利亚、英国及美国一同成为允许仲裁中第三方资助的法域。从背景而言，有必要对第三方资助的法理障碍进行探究，这通常被指有违对包揽诉讼与帮讼分利的禁止。在普通法法域，包揽诉讼是指与案件争议无关的第三方通过提供资金的方式支持当事人的诉讼。帮讼分利则是指第三方以分享当事人的胜诉利益为目的，而对其诉讼行为提供部分或全部的资金支持。历史上，对于融资安排的禁止是为了防止那些经常与虚假诉讼或是纠缠式诉讼牵连在一起的英国贵族对于司法程序的滥用——以资金投入提升诉讼主张的可信性，并从中分取利益。晚近的第三方资助的禁止规则多是为了防止第三方资助人操纵程序，以保护程序正义。正如丹宁勋爵在 Retrepca Mines 一案的判决中写道，第三方资助人“有可能会因为其自身利益而恶意扩大损失、隐匿证据甚至是收买证人”。本世纪初，基于诉讼成本的增长以及法院对于司法程序的有效控制，前述法理障碍的考量发生了改变。一些允许第三方资助的法域试着从实现正义成本的角度验证第三方资助安排的合理性。同时，第三方资助也可以成为一种融资以及风险控制的工具。第三方资助人通过合理地诉讼成本控制以及不利的裁决结果情形下对方诉讼成本的负担对诉讼程序的风险加以控制。这使得商事主体能够将其资金投入到其核心业务，通过让渡部分胜诉利益将诉讼或仲裁的风险及费用转移到第三方资助人。此外，第三方资助也被认为可以为诉讼程序本身引入成本效益的考量，并以此提高诉讼效率。
随着当前对于实现正义成本的关注，普通法法域的法院普遍认为，关于虚假诉讼、纠缠式诉讼，或是滥用司法程序的担忧已不合时宜。在英国，对于这一问题的转折出现在上诉法院 2005年的 Arkin v Borchard Lines Ltd 案。在该案中，法官认为，商业资助者为那些本无法负担诉讼的人提供了资助。次年，澳大利亚高等法院在 Campbell's Cash and Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd案中，也承认了第三方资助安排的合法性。十年后，新加坡跟香港也采纳了类似的做
法。两个法域的立法却不尽相同。香港法是以例外的方式将“仲裁中的第三方资助”从帮讼分利和包揽诉讼这两种侵权类型中排除；新加坡法则采用了较为激进的方式，除了保留了个别例外情况以外，将这些侵权行为类型全部都废止了。
香港
《2017 年仲裁及调解法例 ( 第三者资助）（修订 ) 条例》（修订条例）在仲裁条例（CAP609）
中增 加了第 10 A 部，并且也对调解条例（CAP620）第七条做了修改。值得关注的是，并非全部修订条例都在新的第 10A 部得到重现。第 98E 条规定新增内容的目的在于保证仲裁中的第三方资助不被惯常的普通法原则所限制，并且为其发展提供保障。然而修订条例中明确规定废除帮讼分利和包揽诉讼这两种侵权及犯罪类型的第 98K 和 98L却并没有在新的第 10A部中得以体现。
类似地，修订条例第 98T 条所规定的第三方资助人必须将第三方协议及第三方资助人的主体信息告知仲裁庭及其他当事人的这一内容也并未在新的第 10A 部中体现。尽管新的第 10A 部有一些不尽完善之处，但是它也非常清晰地表明，普通法下帮讼分利和包揽诉讼侵权不适用于仲裁中的第三方资助。第 98G 条对于仲裁中的第三方资助定义如下：
“第三者资助仲裁即就仲裁提供仲裁资助，而提供资助的情况符合以下说明 ——
a. 资助是根据资助协议提供的；
b. 资助是向受资助方提供的；
c. 资助是由出资第三者提供的；
d. 提供资助，是藉此以换取由该出资第三者在限定情况下收取财务利益；限定情况是假若该仲裁按该资助协议所指属成功者，该出资第三者方可收取该等财务利益。”
同时，在第98H条至98G条对于资助协议、受资助方和出资第三人都进行了规定。
新的第 10A 部也对于第三方资助行业进行了规范。根据该部，获授权机构（由律政司司长任命）可以发出实务守则，列出在通常情况下第三方资助人或是与此相关方面通常应当遵守的标准与常规。第98Q条规定，第三方资助人必须确保其提供的推广资料清楚且无误导，资助协议必须列明其主要特点、风险以及相关条款，对于第三方资助人最低资本的要求、争议解决机制、处理利益冲突的程序。
最后，修订后的第 98S 条规定，虽然在法庭和仲裁庭上实务守则本身或是违反实务守则的行为可以被采信，但是仅仅违反实务守则并不会导致被诉。因此，虽然说遵守实务守则并非强制性，但是违反实务守则在某些情况下还是会产生影响。不过，这种温和的规定并不是最优选择，实务守则应当被赋予强制性。
新加坡
虽然新加坡《民法法案》（第 43 章）第 5A 条已经不再将帮讼分利和包揽诉讼列为侵权的类型，但是规定了这“并不影响任何基于本法其他条款认定其违反公共政策或是不合法”。第5 B（2）条则规定，“争议解决程序”中的第三方资助协议不因其系帮讼分利或是包揽诉讼合同而被认定为违反公共利益或是不合法。根据第 5B(10) 条的规定，“争议解决程序”包括“任何解决或是试图解决双方或是多方当事人之间的争议的程序，包括任何民事诉讼、调解、仲裁或是破产程序”。可以说，这个定义已经充分涵盖了在民事法庭的诉讼，对于新加坡来说这也将成为一个主要的调整的地方。在 Re Vanguard Energy Pty Ltd [2015] SGHC 156 一案中，新加坡高等法院确认，虽然在适当情况下允许某些破产案件接受第三方资助，但是第三方资助原则上仍然是被禁止的，如果法律顾问在第三方资助协议中有经济利益，更是受到严格限制。
与香港条例类似，新加坡民法法案也对第三方资助做了具体限制。但是新加坡并没有要求当事人对资助安排进行披露。现在有舆论认为在新加坡的《律师执业规则》之中应当规定，第三方资助安排一经达成，律师就有义务对此进行披露。但这一提议目前也还没有通过。
新加坡和香港的立法都没有涉及费用的问题。仲裁庭是否可以就非案件当事人的第三方资助人作出裁决？毫无疑问，仲裁立法和仲裁规则将会有一些允许仲裁庭将资助安排纳入费用裁决考量范围的一些修改。关于这一方面，我们也发现，新加坡国际仲裁中心（SIAC）在其最新的 2017 版《投资仲裁规则》第 33.1 条中就明确规定了仲裁庭在考虑费用比例时应当将第三方资助安排考虑在内。在英国，Essar Oilfields Services Ltd v Norscot Rig Management PVT Ltd 一案也确立了败诉方应当赔偿第三方资助人费用的规则。
英国及澳大利亚
香港和新加坡两地对于第三方资助行业的规范是有利于行业发展的。而在英国和澳大利亚则是“无为而治”的方式，迄今仍堪称范例。
英国通过诉讼资助人协会来实现第三方资助行业的行业自律。协会通过了行为规范，该行为规范中也包含了关于仲裁的第三方资助。该行为规范在 2011 年正式公布。规范要求会员资助人必须有足够的资源能够资助所有协议约定的争议，并且能够涵盖其资助安排下至少 36 个月内的债务总额。同时，规范也明确规定资助人不得操纵诉讼或者干预和解协商过程，也不得要求当事人律师从事有违其职业规范的行为。到目前为止，由于作为协会会员本身带来的良好声誉，使得会员都能够很好地遵守这一规范要求。
第三方资助目前在澳大利亚仍然处于鲜有规范的状态。对于资助人唯一的要求就是其应当具有避免利益冲突的机制。
澳大利亚律师经常抱怨在胜诉时对于律师费的支付有上限，但对第三方资助的费用却没有。以维多利亚州为例，律师胜诉后不能收超过 25% 的酬金，且不能分享顾客的受偿金额，但是对第三方资助却没有酬金金额上限的限制。这是有点反常的，毕竟律师身负极为严格的职业责任，但第三方资助人并没有。
总之，新加坡和香港关于第三方资助的立法或许预示着国际仲裁的一个新的时代。当然，这些立法也使得香港和新加坡与其他同样允许第三方资助的法域相比仍然保持强劲的竞争力。
作者：北京仲裁委员会/北京国际仲裁中心仲裁员、御准仲裁员协会澳大利亚分会主席卡罗琳・肯尼御用大律师（Caroline Kenny QC）。北仲仲裁秘书林晨曦对文章亦有 贡献。
本文根据卡罗琳・肯尼御用大律师在2017年北仲香港年度观察发布会的演讲稿整理而成。
This article focuses on new legislation introduced by Singapore and Hong Kong to allow thirdparty funding of arbitrations. The legis-lation is an important step in bringing these popular arbitral jurisdictions in line with other jurisdictions including Australia, England, and the US.
By way of background, it is relevant to consider the reasons for the prohibition on third party funding. In common law jurisdictions, third party funding was prohibited because it was said to offend the medieval torts and crimes of maintenance and champerty.
Maintenance refers to an unconnected third party assisting to maintain litigation by providing financial assistance. Champerty is where a third party pays some or all of the costs associated with litigation in return for a share of the proceeds. The prohibition against funding arrangements was historically intended to prevent the abuse of judicial process by wealthy English noblemen who would associate themselves with fraudulent or vexatious claims, thereby strengthening the credibility of the claims, and in return receiving a share of the profits.
Rules against third party funding were more recently justified on the public policy basis of protecting the processes of justice from manipulation by a third party who, in Lord Denning’s words in ReTrepca Mines (No 2) [1963] Ch 199, might “…be tempted, for his own personal gain, to inflame the damages, to suppress evidence, or even to suborn witnesses”.
But attitudes changed early this century to reflect concerns about the cost of access to justice and the recognition that courts are more than capable of controlling their own processes. The jurisdictions that permit third party funding arrangements initially justified them on an access to justice basis.
It is also now recognised that third party funding is a financing and risk-management tool. Third party funders provide risk management with respect to ensuring the predictability of the payment of costs and providing protection from opponent costs awards in adverse outcomes. This allows businesses to apply their own funds towards their core business while shifting the risk and cost of their litigation and arbitration claims to the funder, in ex-change for a relatively small share of the damages if the claim succeeds. It is also argued that third party funding enhances the efficiency of litigation through the introduction of commercial considerations that reduce costs.
With today’s emphasis on providing access to justice, courts in common law countries generally consider the concerns of the funding of potentially fraudulent or vexatious cases, or the manipulation of the justice system to be outdated. In England, the turning point came with the Court of Appeal’s decision in Arkin v Borchard Lines Ltd [2005], where it described commercial funders as groups who “provide help to those seeking access to justice which they could not otherwise afford”. The next year, the Australian High Court recognized the legitimacy of funding arrangements in Campbell’s Cash and Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd [2006].
A decade later, so have Singapore and Hong Kong. The legislation introduced in both jurisdictions is different. While Hong Kong carves out an exception to the torts of maintenance and champerty for what is defined as “third party funding of arbitration”, the Singapore legislation has been more strident and has abolished those torts, with certain exceptions.
THE HONG KONG APPROACH
The Hong Kong Arbitration and Mediation Legislation (Third Party Funding) (Amendment) Ordinance 2017 introduced a new part 10A into the Arbitration Ordinance (CAP 609), and also amended section 7 of the Mediation Ordinance (CAP 620). It is interesting to note that not all of the amendment ordinance is reproduced in the new part 10A of the arbitration ordinance. Section 98E of the arbitration ordinance provides that the purposes of the new part are to: (a) ensure that third party funding of arbitration is not prohibited by particular common law doctrines; and (b) provide for measures and safeguards in relation to third party funding of arbitration. However, sections 98K and 98L of the amendment ordinance, which expressly abrogate the crimes and torts of maintenance and champerty, are not reproduced in part 10A.
Similarly, section 98T of the amendment ordinance, which provides that a funded party must notify the tribunal and every other party of the existence of a funding agreement and the identity of the funder, have not been reproduced in the new part 10A.
Notwithstanding these omissions in the new part 10A, it is clear that the common law torts of champerty and maintenance will not apply to “third party funding of arbitration”. Section 98G defines “third party funding of arbitration” as:
“… the provision of arbitration funding for an arbitration –
a. under a funding agreement;
b. to a funded party;
c. by a third party funder; and
d. in return for the third party funder receiving a financial benefit only if the arbitration is successful within the meaning of the funding agreement.”
Each of the relevant terms in section 98G is then defined.
The new part 10A also makes provision for regulating the third party funding industry. It provides that an advisory body (to be appointed by the secretary of justice) may issue a code of practice setting out the practices and standards with which third party funders will ordinarily be expected to comply.
Section 98Q provides that the code of practice “may” contain provisions concerning, inter alia, the content of third party funding promotional material, the content of funding agreements including their key features, risks and terms, minimum capital requirements for funders, complaint procedures, and how to address conflicts of interest.
Finally, the new section 98S provides that a failure to comply with any code of practice does not of itself render a person liable to any judicial or other proceedings, although the code of practice is admissible and non-compliance with it may be taken into account if it is relevant to a question before a court or arbitral tribunal. Therefore although compliance is not mandatory, the failure to comply with the code of practice may be relevant in certain circumstances. This lukewarm approach to compliance is regrettable. If there is a code of practice, compliance should be mandatory.
THE SINGAPORE APPROACH
Section 5A of the Singapore Civil Law Act (chapter 43) abolishes the tort of maintenance and champerty, but provides that this “does not affect any rule of that law as to the cases in which a contract is to be treated as contrary to public policy or otherwise illegal”.
Section 5B(2) then provides that a contract for third party funding of “dispute resolution proceedings” is “not contrary to public policy or otherwise illegal by reason that it is a contract for maintenance or champerty”. “Dispute resolution proceedings” is defined in Section 5B(10) as “the entire process of resolving or attempting to resolve a dispute between two or more parties, and includes any civil, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or insolvency proceedings”.
Arguably, this definition is sufficient to include litigation in civil courts, which would be a major change for Singapore. In Re Vanguard Energy Pty Ltd [2015], the High Court confirmed that while funding could be available for certain insolvency cases under appropriate circumstances, funding was still prohibited, and there were strict rules against legal advisers having an economic interest in a third party funding arrangement.
Like the Hong Kong ordinance, the Civil Law Act provides for the eventual regulation of third party funding. However, the Singapore act does not require mandatory disclosure of funding arrangements. There is a proposal to amend the professional conduct rules to require lawyers to disclose a funding arrangement as soon as practicable, but this has yet to occur.
Neither the Hong Kong nor the Singapore legislation addresses the issue of costs. How does a tribunal have power to make orders against funders who are not parties to the proceedings? No doubt it is envisaged there will be some amendment to the arbitration legislation or rules to allow tribunals to take funding arrangements into account when making awards of costs.
It is noted in this regard that rule 33.1 of the new 2017 SIAC investment arbitration rules provides that the tribunal may take account of third party funding arrangements when considering apportioning costs of the arbitration. In England it has been held that an unsuccessful party may be liable to pay a third party funders costs: Essar Oilfields Services Ltd v Norscot Rig Management PVT Ltd [2016].
ENGLAND AND AUSTRALIA
The proposal to regulate the funding industry in Hong Kong and Singapore is a welcome development in the area. In England and Australia there is a “hands off” approach to regulation that has been surprisingly successful to date.
England has adopted a model of self-regulation through the Association of Litigation Funders. This group adopted a code of conduct for litigation funders that covers arbitration. Created in 2011, the code provides rules for third parties that must be complied with if a funder is to remain a member of the association.
The code requires that funders must have sufficient resources to fund all the disputes they have agreed to fund, and to cover aggregate liabilities under all of their funding agreements for a minimum period of 36 months. The rules also stipulate that funders cannot take control of litigation or settlement negotiations, and are prohibited from causing the litigant’s lawyers to act in breach of their professional duties. This code has been effective to date because the prestige of membership appears to be a sufficient incentive to ensure compliance.
In Australia, the third party funding industry is unregulated. The only requirement is that funders have mechanisms to avoid conflicts of interest. Lawyers in Australia often complain that they are subject to a cap on the amount they can recover for conditional fee arrangements if the claim succeeds, but funders are not. In the state of Victoria, for example, lawyers cannot recover more than an uplift of 25% of their fees on a conditional fee arrangement if the case succeeds, and cannot share in the damages, whereas there is no cap for third party funders. This is somewhat anomalous as lawyers have strict professional conduct duties whereas funders do not.
In conclusion, the legislations in Hong Kong and Singapore are likely to herald a new era for international arbitration and will ensure these jurisdictions remain competitive with other jurisdictions that allow funding.
Caroline Kenny QC is an arbitrator of Beijing Arbitration Commission/Beijing International Arbitration Centre (BAC/BIAC) and president of CIArb Australia branch. BAC/BIAC’s case manager, Gerard Lin, also contributed to the article.
The article is adapted from a speech by Kenny at a 2017 Hong Kong summit on commercial dispute resolution in China.
