发布时间： Wed Apr 15 13:33:02 CST 2020
供稿人：许德风
近年来，因资产管理合同而发生的争议很多，如何妥善处理这些纠纷，值得思考。本文拟就资管交易中的信义义务问题，分析如下：
资管交易中委托人、管理人之间的法律关系，为通常所说的信义义务关系，应用信义义务的分析框架处理。
需要说明的是，在销售阶段中，虽然尚处于合同协商期，但因为当事人的目的是要建立资管合同关系，因此管理人若未对资管合同进行讲解或说明、未提示风险、未尽到合格投资者审核义务、未在冷静期满后安排推介业务以外的人进行回访等，可认为管理人的行为构成欺诈或者存在缔约过失，也可以认为管理人的欺诈行为构成侵权，进而应允许委托人撤销合同或者主张合同无效，或允许委托人通过侵权救济而摆脱合同关系。
资管合同应在信义义务的框架下履行。这里的信义义务并不是特别的法律概念，而只是对委托人和受托人之间法律关系的抽象概括。信义义务包括忠实义务（通常所说的“诚实信用”）、勤勉义务（通常所说的“勤勉尽责”）两个方面。
在信义义务关系中，一方（委托人）将自身的利益完全托付给另一方（受托人），若不加以规制，委托人的利益将极易受损害，甚至使此种交易安排关系无法真正达成。这意味着信义义务本质上是一种“利他”义务，与一般交易中的“利己”（如买卖）或“善管”（如保管）都不同，强调受托人要告知委托人全部信息、交出全部获益、（在管理费用之外）不谋求任何私益。若认识到这一点，便可以更好地理解资管交易、证券交易中信息披露的严肃性，理解实践中非常多“知情权”争议所涉及的并不是无关痛痒的信息获取与传递问题。
忠实义务是要求义务人不得侵吞属于委托人的资产或者抢夺委托人的机会，若违反忠实义务，管理人应赔偿委托人的相应损失。在私募投资中，受托人未经允许改变投资用途（超越约定明确的投资范围和投资比例，尤其是从低风险到高风险、关联交易、挪用投资资产），在性质上构成严重违约，鉴于多半存在利益冲突的情况，因此可以认为其构成对忠实义务的违反。
对忠实义务的违反，应当持严格的乃至惩罚的态度。具体体现为：其一，在因果关系的认定上，必要时可以降低对条件因果关系的要求，在损害存在多种原因时，只要违反忠实义务的行为是其中之一，即可要求管理人承担责任;其二，在损害数额上，倾向于要求管理人就有关损害承担全部的责任。
违反勤勉义务的法律责任。勤勉义务要求管理人努力工作，若违反该义务（如应当及时止损预警而未及时止损，如应及时清算而未及时清算），应结合义务违反的程度、损害的内容、因果关系等判断委托人可获得的赔偿数额，尤其要求受害人只能就管理人违反勤勉义务的行为而要求相应的损害赔偿。在考察勤勉义务时，应注重考虑商业判断规则的适用。如在仲裁案中，委托人主张大盘高开，股票普涨而有关资管计划的股票市值并未变动或不涨反跌，便未必能成为管理人承担责任的依据。又如管理人因承担刑事责任而丧失管理人资格，充其量只是相当于管理人不工作，也是勤勉义务的问题。
资管合同履约过程中的信息披露义务是忠实义务和勤勉义务的辅助性义务，是辅助委托人了解受托人是否履行忠实义务和勤勉义务的工具保障。信息披露义务本身的违反，并不当然产生赔偿责任或可据此认定构成勤勉义务或忠实义务的违反，而应结合忠实义务和勤勉义务违反的具体情形加以认定。
作者：北京仲裁委员会/北京国际仲裁中心仲裁员、北京大学法学院教授许德风。墨尔本大学周婧女士对文章亦有贡献。
Fiduciary Duty in Asset Management Transactions
With the rising number of disputes from asset management transactions in recent years, dealing with such disputes properly is worth discussion. The legal relationship between a client and a manager in asset management transactions – commonly referred to as the fiduciary relationship – should be dealt with under the analytical framework of the fiduciary duty.
Notably, although the process of sale is within the contract negotiation stage, the ultimate goal of the parties is to establish a relationship under the asset management contract. As such, a manager who fails to undertake explanations or clarifications regarding the asset management contract, does not disclose risks, fails to fulfil investor review obligations, or does not arrange a return visit by an individual outside of the promotional team after the expiration of the cooling-off period, can be perceived as harbouring other faults in conclusion of the contract. Each of these situations may constitute a ground for the client to cancel the contract, or claim for the invalidity of the contract, or even constitute a ground for tort, which allows the client to be rid of the contractual relationship.
The asset management contract should be carried out under the framework of the fiduciary duty. Under Chinese law, this fiduciary duty is an abstraction and generalisation of the legal relationship between a client and a manager and is comprised of two types of duties: the duty of loyalty; and the duty of care.
In fiduciary relationships, one party (the client) wholly entrusts their interests to the other party (the fiduciary). If no effective restrictions as default rules apply, the client’s interests can be easily harmed, which may make it impossible to reach a genuine agreement. This suggests that the fiduciary duty is fundamentally an “altruistic” duty, differing from the values of “selfishness” (e.g., sales) or “prudent management” (e.g., custodianship) within regular transactions.
The different emphasis would be reflected in the contract arrangements that the fiduciary shall fully disclose information to the client, surrendering the entirety of their own benefits and not pursuing any personal interests (beyond the management fees). Acknowledging this emphasis enables a better understanding of the seriousness of information disclosure in asset management and securities transactions. It further recognises that many practical effects of the controversial “right to know” are not inconsequential questions of information acquirement and transmission.
The duty of loyalty requires that the obligor must not misappropriate the client’s assets or seize the client’s opportunities. If the duty of loyalty is breached, the manager should compensate the client’s corresponding losses. In private equity investments, the fiduciary is not permitted to deviate from the original stipulated purpose of the investment. Exceeding an explicit and previously arranged investment scope and investment ratio – particularly from low risk to high risk, related party transactions, diverting investment assets – naturally constitutes a grave violation, given that most circumstances involve conflicts of interest and can thus be seen as breaches of the duty of loyalty.
Breaches of the duty of loyalty should be met with strict and punitive approaches. First, in determining causality, the requirements for a butfor test, a test commonly used in both tort and criminal law to determine actual causation, can be reduced when necessary. When there are multiple causes of incurred loss, as long as the breach of the duty of loyalty is among them, the manager should be held accountable. Second, it is preferable that the manager breaching loyalty should bear full responsibility for the amount of damages.
Duty of care requires the manager to work hard. If this duty of care is breached (if a stop-loss alert should be issued but the stop-loss is not promptly executed, or if accounts are not settled in a timely manner), then the severity of breach, content of loss, causality, etc., should be collectively assessed to determine the amount of compensation available to the client.
Notably, the plaintiff is allowed to be compensated only for losses corresponding to conduct related to the manager’s breach of the duty of care. In determining the duty of care, the applicability of the business judgment rule is particularly worth considering. For example, in an arbitration case, the client’s claim that the market value of the stock related to the asset management plan has not changed, or fell instead of rising while the stock market is prosperous and the stocks’ price generally went up, may not be a basis for the manager’s liability. Another example is that a manager is disqualified because of criminal charges. It will at best be equivalent to the manager not working, and is also a matter of the duty of care.
During the performance process of the asset management contract, information disclosure obligations are supplementary duties to the duty of loyalty and the duty of careacting as a facilitating mechanism that assists the client to investigate whether or not the fiduciary is fulfilling these duties. Thus, a breach of the information disclosure duty itself will not necessarily result in compensatory liability or grounds for finding a breach of the duty of care or duty of loyalty; instead, this determination should be made by considering the aggregation of specific circumstances relevant to breaches of the duty of loyalty and the duty of care.
Xu Defeng is an arbitrator with Beijing Arbitration Commission/Beijing International Arbitration Center (BAC/BIAC), and a professor at Peking University’s Law School. Catherine Zhou, from the University of Melbourne, also contributed to this article.
