北京仲裁委员会

目前学界对于首席仲裁员在仲裁庭决定中的作用研究甚少。但首席仲裁员的选定对于仲裁程序却有着极其重要的作用。其中一个重要性表现在，通过首席仲裁员的选定程序，可以限制双方当事人通过选定边裁而对仲裁程序乃至最终的裁决结果所产生的影响。

这种影响表现是多方面的。例如，在仲裁程序中，一般由首席仲裁员控制程序进程并主持庭审，首席仲裁员语言风格对于裁决行文有着重要的影响，且一些非关键性的问题仲裁庭可以授权首席仲裁员单独做出决定（《北京仲裁委员会仲裁规则》第35条就有这样的规定）。若边裁缺乏经验，那么首席仲裁员对于裁决结果影响力则更加明显，因为边裁是习惯顺从于首席的意见。

因此，首席仲裁员在仲裁程序中扮演着非常重要的角色。然而，首席仲裁员的选定程序却不尽相同。

例如，《北京仲裁委员会仲裁规则》要求当事人从其仲裁员名册中选择仲裁员并且设置了在当事人未能选定仲裁员时由北京仲裁委员会（北仲）主任来选定仲裁员的缺省规则（第9条、第18条和第19条）。

对于首席仲裁员的选择，每一方当事人都可以从仲裁员名册中选择一至三名作为首席仲裁员的候选人，也可以要求北仲提供首席仲裁员的候选名单。推荐名单或者选择名单中没有相同的人选，由主任在推荐名单或者选择名单之外指定首席仲裁员。

中国之外的其他法域的情况则非常不同。许多仲裁机构的规则允许当事人就仲裁员的选定程序达成合意。例如，新加坡国际仲裁中心（2016规则）、国际商会国际仲裁院、伦敦国际仲裁院都尊重当事人在仲裁条款中的约定。不过，在这些机构规则中所有的提名都必须由机构确认。

《联合国国际贸易法委员会仲裁规则》则更加特别。其并非根据双方仲裁协议的约定而是直接在规则中规定采用边裁共同选定首席的方式。第九条规定：“指定三名仲裁员的，每一方当事人应各指定一名仲裁员。第三名仲裁员应由已被选定的两名仲裁员选定，担任首席仲裁员。”这也是在当事人没有约定的情况下的缺省条款。

目前这种对于边裁选定首席仲裁员的权利不加限制的机制也并不都是完美的。如果边裁都富有经验且对其他适合担任首席的仲裁员都比较熟悉，这种机制就会很奏效。

但是如果其中的一个边裁经验欠缺，就会遵从于另一个有经验的边裁的选择；这意味着当事人对于仲裁庭最关键的组成人员丧失了直接的话语权，因此也就可能稀释当事人选定的仲裁员在仲裁庭成员互动时的影响力。

由于是边裁而非当事人来选定首席仲裁员，因此，在选定首席仲裁员过程中边裁应当充分询问当事人。一般而言这是需要在仲裁协议中约定的，但是现实中却极少有这样的约定。

更实际的建议是，当事人或其律师在选定边裁时就明确告知被选定的仲裁员，其希望在选定首席仲裁员时能够征求其意见。

显然，对于当事人的需求应当有一定的限制。例如，当事人不能就候选人对于实体问题的观点提出要求，但是可以寻求一个在特定实体领域或是法律领域经验丰富的候选人。《国际律师协会国际仲裁代理人指引》允许边裁之间就首席仲裁员的选择进行沟

通，而2014年《伦敦国际仲裁院仲裁规则》则要求在进行沟通之前应当告知伦敦国际仲裁院书记员。同时，《国际律师协会国际仲裁代理人指引》也允许在各方当事人均同意的情况下，当事人与首席仲裁员候选人进行直接的沟通。

还有一个有待澄清的问题在于，在选定首席仲裁员时，边裁是作为选定其的一方当事人的代理人，还是其直接在其权限范围内作为委托人本身。目前普遍的看法认为，除非基于诸如利益冲突或是缺乏经验等善意理由，当事人并不享有对于首席仲裁员指定的否决权。

虽然，选定首席仲裁员的方式各不相同，但是现实中各方通常会对于首席仲裁员的选择达成妥协，或者说如果基于策略考虑而无法达成一致，则会由仲裁机构或者法院进行指定。

总之，由于首席仲裁员的选任对于仲裁程序乃至最终的裁决都有着不可替代的影响，因此即便对于首席仲裁员的决定没有最终的话语权，当事人及其代理人还是应当确保在最终指定首席仲裁员之前已经向他们征求过意见。

There appears to be limited research or academic writing on the influence of the chair or presiding arbitrator on arbitral decisions,yet the role is a crucial one. In particular, it can impact on the contribution of party-appointed arbitrators and, consequently, the ultimate decision making of a tribunal.

This influence can manifest in various ways, and following are some examples.It is the chair or presiding arbitrator who usually dictates the pace and tone of the arbitration, and conducts the hearings;the award will usually be in the words of the chair, and chairs are often given considerable discretion as to the drafting of the award; co-arbitrators may delegate day-to-day unimportant procedural decisions,such as short extensions of time,to the chair alone, for example article 35 of the Beijing Arbitration Commission/Beijing International Arbitration Centre (BAC) Rules.

The position is exacerbated where there are inexperienced or novice co-arbitrators who will often pay deference to the chair, resulting in the chair having a disproportionate influence or impact on decisions.

The presiding arbitrator’s role is,therefore, vitally important. Yet the procedure for selecting the chair or presiding arbitrator is neither universal nor necessarily without its problems. The following are some alternative ways of choosing a chair.

The BAC rules, for example, require parties to choose arbitrators from its panel,and in default, for the chairman of the BAC to choose the arbitrator (see articles 9,18 and 19). As for the presiding arbitrator,the parties may each nominate between one and three arbitrator(s) from the panel list as candidate(s) or seek a short-list of names from the BAC for the role. In the absence of a single common candidate the decision is left to the chairman of the BAC.

Moving away from China to other jurisdictions,the position is often rather different,and institutional rules vary. Many arbitral institutional rules permit the parties to agree on alternative procedures.For instance, the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) 2016 Rules,article 11(3); the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) article 12(5); and the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) article 7 all defer to the agreement of the parties where the arbitration clause provides, although nominations are subject to confirmation and appointment by the arbitral institution.

Most arbitration clauses, where such a provision is made, provide that the co-arbitrators rather than the institution should nominate the presiding arbitrator.

The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Rules are more specific and do not depend on the agreement of the parties for the co-arbitrators to choose the presiding arbitration. It is implied from agreement to the UNCITRAL rules. Article 9 provides that: “If three arbitrators are to be appointed, each party must appoint one arbitrator. The two arbitrators thus appointed must choose the third arbitrator who will act as the presiding arbitrator of the arbitral tribunal.”

The current practice of enabling co-arbitrators to have an unfettered choice of presiding arbitrator is not always ideal.It may work well if the arbitrators are experienced and familiar with other arbitrators who would make good presiding arbitrators. However, it works less well,for example, if one of the co-arbitrators is inexperienced and effectively has to defer to the choice of the experienced co-arbitrator.It also means that the parties have no direct say in what is perhaps the most crucial member of the tribunal, thereby possibly diluting the respective ability of the party-appointed arbitrators to influence the dynamics of the tribunal.

Thus it is important for parties to be consulted on the presiding arbitrator, for unlike the BAC rules, it is most frequently the co-arbitrators, not the parties, who select the presiding arbitrator. Ideally, this should be provided for in the arbitration agreement, but it rarely is. More practically,it is advisable when nominating a party appointed arbitrator for parties or, in practice, their lawyers, to make it clear to him or her that they wish to be consulted on the presiding arbitrator before he or she is chosen.

Obviously, there is a limit to what the parties can request. They cannot address the views of a candidate on the merits, but they can seek someone experienced in a particular field of industry or a particular law, for example. The International Bar Association (IBA) Guidelines on Party Representation permit communication with party-nominated arbitrators on the choice of presiding arbitrator, although the 2014 LCIA rules require notification to the registrar before this is done (article 13.5). The IBA guidelines permit direct communication between the parties and candidates for presiding arbitrator only where all parties agree (article 8(b)-(d)).

Although how the presiding arbitrator is appointed varies, the reality is that the chair is often a compromise − or if no agreement can be reached because of tactical manoeuvres or otherwise − then the decision is left to an arbitral institution,or occasionally to the court.

Because the appointing procedure for presiding arbitrators has a considerable impact on arbitration, and in consideration of the presiding arbitrator’s central role in deciding the outcome of cases,parties and their advisers should ensure that they are consulted before a presiding arbitrator is chosen, even though they do not have the final word on the ultimate candidate.